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BRINGING ORDER TO CYBERMEDICINE:
APPLYING THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE DOCTRINE TO TAME THE WILD
WILD WEB
Abstract: The model of health care offerings via the Internet, generally
known as "cybermedicine," may prove to be a significant advance in the
provision of medical services. At present, however, cybermedicine
presents many potential hazards to "cyberpatients" because it is virtually
unregulated. This Note asserts the need for a revival of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine to address these dangers. The corporate
practice of medicine doctrine prohibits corporations and other lay
entities from employing physicians. This Note examines the various
kinds of cybermedicine, describes the advantages and disadvantages
flowing from the practice of medicine over the Internet, and advocates
the application of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to
cybermedicine as an intermediate regulatory measure to stein the
dangers and abuses that currently abound in cybermedicine.
INTRODUCTION
Soraya Bittencourt is burdened by two health problems: Grave's
disease, a dangerous thyroid condition, and diabetes. Despite these
infirmities, she maintains a rigorous work schedule as an executive for
a computer software company. One would think that Soraya would be
unable to keep her weekly doctor's appointment, given her time-
intensive work commitment. In reality, however, she has no problem
in making time to "meet" with her physician. Rather than drive to the
doctor's office, she logs onto the Internet and consults with her doc-
tor in cyberspace. Thanks to the Internet, Soraya can send the results
from her daily blood tests and elicit comments from her doctor—all
in a matter of seconds.' In using Internet technology for personal
health purposes, Soraya is participating in cybermedicine and taking
part in the "quiet revolution" currently under way in the world of
medicine. 2
See Quacks, Bogus Reatments Infect the Internet, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 21,
1996, at ID [hereinafter Bogus Thattnents),
2 Diane Jennings, Bitter Pill to Swallow,• rybennedicine' Simplicity Has Fans but Raises Con-
cerns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1998, at 1A.
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With the expansion of telecommunications technology, innova-
tive models of health care delivery have evolved. 3
 Where patients once
needed to visit a physician in person to receive medical treatment,
now they can utilize telephonic, video, and computer technology to
interact with medical practitioners in new and unique ways. 4
 The
model of health care offerings via the Internet, generally known as
"cybermedicine," may prove to be a significant advance in the provi-
sion of medical services. 5 At present, however, cybermedicine presents
many potential hazards to "cyberpatients." 6 Those seeking medical
advice on the Internet may fall victim to bad medical advice proffered
by non-physicians, unlicensed physicians, or other assorted quacks
operating in cyberspace.? In addition, due to its sudden and tremen-
dous growth, cybermedicine has become big business, creating a ten-
sion for health care providers between delivering proper medical care
and making a healthy profit'
Many of the dangers posed by cybermedicine are exacerbated by
the fact that it is virtually unregulated at present.9 On occasion, sev-
eral states have apprehended persons practicing medicine over the
Internet without a valid medical license."' Sporadic enforcement of
state licensing laws, however, does little to stem the potential abuses
and rampant commercialism of cybermedicine. 11
This Note asserts the need for a revival by states of the corporate
practice of medicine prohibition to address the dangers posed by cy-
bermedicine. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibits
3 See ALAN S. GOLDBERG & JOCELYN F. GORDON, TELEMEDICINE: EMERGING LEGAL IS-
SUES 1-2 (1998); Barbara J. Tyler, Cyberdoctors: The Virtual Housecall—The Actual Practice of
Medicine on the Internet is Here; Is it a Telemedical Accident Waiting to Happen?, 31 IND. L. REV.
259, 259-63 (1998).
4 See GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 1.
5 See Nicholas P. Terry, Cybe,Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybertnedicine, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 327, 328 (1999).
6 See Jennings, supra note 2, at 1A; Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at ID.
7 See Gunther Eysenbach & Thomas L. Diepgen, Evaluation of Cyberdors, 353 THE LAN-
cEr 1526, 1526 (1998); Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at 1D; Good Morning America: Internet
House Calls (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 3, 1999) (transcript #99080311301) thereinaf-
ter Good Morning America]. A quack is "a pretender to medical skill" or "dishonest practi-
tioner." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1856 (Philip Babcock Cove
ed., 1986).
See Jennings, supra note 2,'at 1A; Gary Baldwin, Web Rx, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 3,
1998, at 23.
9 See Jan Greene, Sign on and Say Ah-h-h-h-h,' flose. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Apr. 20,
1997, at 45; Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at 1 D.
1° SeeJennings, supra note 2, at 1A.
11 See id.; Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at 1D,
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corporations and other lay entities from employing physicians. 12 The
doctrine is aimed at preserving physicians' professional autonomy in
the provision of quality healthcare." Part I of this Note will detail the
various manifestations of cybermedicine and describe the advantages
and disadvantages flowing from the practice of medicine over the
Internet." Part II will describe the context in which the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine originated and its current status in the
modern health care climate." Finally, Part III will advocate the appli-
cation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to cybertnedi-
cine as at least an intermediate regulatory measure to stern the dan-
gers and abuses that currently abound in cybermedicine. 16
I. THE BACKGROUND AND CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF CYBERMEDICINE
A. Cy6ermedicine: Origin & Description
Advancement in telecommunications technology has had a
significant impact on the provision of health care." Prior to the in-
vention of the telephone, physicians relied almost exclusively on face-
to-face consultations in treating their patients." The advent of the
telephone opened another avenue for patient/physician interaction
and has become a commonplace means for giving and receiving
medical assistance, particularly in emergency situations. 19 Recent
technological innovations have fueled a further expansion of "tele-
medicine," the use of telecommunications and video technology to
provide health care services to patients at some location distant from
the provider." For instance, improved satellite communications allow
doctors to utilize interactive television systems for real-time examina-
tions, diagnosis and treatment.21
12 See George F. Indest, III & Barbara A. Egolf, Is Medicine Headed for an Assembly Line?
Exploring the Doctrine of the Unauthorized Corporate Practice of Medicine, 6 Bus. L. TODAY 32, 33-
34 (1997).
15 See id.
14 See infra notes 17-103 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 104-199 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 200-254 and accompanying text.
17 See GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 1.
16 See Alissa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-Patient Communication by Elec-
tronic Mail, 25 Am. J.L. & MED. 267, 268 (1999).
19 See id.; Alissa R. Spielberg, On Call and Online: Sociohistorical, Legal, and Ethical Impli-
cations of E-Mail for the Patient-Phyisician Relationship, 280 JAMA 1353, 1354 (1998).
20 GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 1.
21 See id. "Real-time" communication refers to communication via the Internet whereby
computer users exchange written messages instantaneously transmitted through cyber-
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As with telephonic and video technology, the computer technol-
ogy of the 1980s and 1990s has expanded the possibilities for the pro-
vision of health care.22
 At present, doctors and patients can, and in-
creasingly do, correspond by e-mail." This particular manifestation of
cybermedicine, the practice of medicine via computer, is merely an
extension of telemedicine in that it serves to patch geographical holes
in medical coverage. 24
 Other manifestations of cybermedicine, how-
ever, prove that cybermedicine encompasses much more than tele-
medicine. 25
 Computer technology—in particular, the Internet—allows
a far greater array of unique interactions among health care providers
and consumer-patients, including marketing, creating pa-
tient/physician relationships, providing advice, and prescribing and
selling drugs—and levels of interactivity as yet unknown. 26
The plethora of medically-related websites currently available on
the Internet illustrates the breadth and variety of cybermedicine. 27
CyberDocs is representative of websites that offer consumer-patients
the opportunity to initiate "live" consultations with physicians on the
Internet. 28
 The two co-founders of the website, Dr. Steven Kohler and
Dr. Kerry Archer, advertise the service as a "virtual housecall."29
 Upon
connecting to CyberDocs, patients input their medical history, reason
for consulting the doctor and credit card number." After the patient
completes these preliminary matters, the "cyberdoctor" logs on and
the physician and patient can engage in real-time communication
space, thereby creating the effect of a live" conversation. See Greene, supra note 9, at 45;
CyberDocs Today Announced the First Virtual Doctors Office on the World Wide Web!, M2 Presswire,
Oct. 4, 1996, available at 1996 WL 11276562 thereinafter CyberDocs Today Announced).
22 See Spielberg, supra note 18, at 269-70; Terry, supra note 5, at 328.
" See, e.g., Spielberg, supra note 18, at 269; Christine Gorman, E-Mail Your Doctor; Frus-
trated by Phone Tag? join the Growing Ranks of Doctors and Patients Talking Through the Net,
TnaE, Aug. 17, 1998, at 82; Richard Saltus, Take Two Aspirin and E-Mail Me in the Morning;
BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Jan, 18, 1998, at 11.
24 See Terry, supra note 5, at 327.
22 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 335-36; Tyler, supra note 3, at 263.
28 See CyberDocs, at lutp://www.cyberdocs.com
 (last visited Apr. 8, 2000); Terry, supra
note 5, at 349; Aaron Zitner, Cybermedicine Seen as Unhealthy by Some; Concerns Voiced Over
Diagnosing Ills, Prescribing Medicine on Wet, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1998, at C1. Among
other websites offering Internet medical consultations are Go Ask Alice! and Yahoo!. See
Go Ask Alice!, at hup://www.goaskalice.columbia.edu/about.html
 (last visited Apr. 8,
2000); Yahoo!, at Itttp://wrvw.yaltoo.com/Health
 (last visited Apr. 8, 2000).
22 See Zither, supra note 28, at Cl; CyberDocs Today Announced, supra note 21.
sa See Tyler, supra note 3, at 285-86. A typical visit to CyberDocs costs fifty dollars. See id.
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over the Internet." During the course of this virtual interaction, the
physician may diagnose the patient's ailment and prescribe medica-
tion, without ever meeting the patient face-to-face."
In addition to "live" medical consultations on the Internet, pa-
tients wishing to receive prescription medicine can bypass a visit to
the local pharmacy or doctor's office by accessing online pharmacies
such as Pill Box Pharmacy." Persons seeking refills of existing pre-
scriptions can purchase drugs over the computer simply by clicking
the mouse and providing their credit card number." For patient-
consumers without prescriptions, many pharmacy websites make
available an online questionnaire, which includes questions about
physical characteristics and medical history." A cyberdoctor then ex-
amines the completed questionnaire and decides whether or not to
fill the requested order for the patient 36
Medical research firms have joined doctors and pharmacists in
creating innovative Internet business models." MedOptions and
other similar medical research websites assist persons seeking infor-
mation on specific aihnents and diseases." For a fee varying from $89
to $500, researchers scour the World Wide Web for information per-
tinent to the patient's condition and prepare a report with the latest
research and a list of top specialists."
B. Advantages of Cybermedidne
In many ways, cybermedicine represents a valuable innovation in
the provision of health care. 40 The use of computers allows patients to
SI See id. at 286. A "cyberdoctor" is one who practices medicine over the Internet. See
Lisa Ramirez, 'Cybenlocs' Popular, But Potentially Dangerous Some Say, KNIGHT KIDDER WASH-
INGTON BuREAu, July 26, 1999.
32 See Zioner, supra note 28, at Cl.
33 See Pill Box Pharmacy, at littp://www.pillboxpharmacy.com/serviceslitml  (last vis-
ited Apr. 8, 2000); Jennings, supra note 2, at 1A. Other online pharmacies include U-Save
Pharmacy and SafeNet Pharmacy. See U-Save Pharmacy, at littp://www.capc.com/usave/
index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2000); SafeNet Pharmacy, at littp://www.safenet-
pharmacy.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2000).
Seejennings, supra note 2, at 1A.
" See id.
36
 See id.
37 Marc Fisher, The Doctor is Out; When Illness Struck, He Plunged into the New Medical Real-
ity—And Discovered That the Line Between Patient and Physician is Gone, THE WASHINGTON
POST, July 19, 1998, at W08.
28
 See id.
" See id.
See Tyler, supra note 3, at 263; Bogus Treatments, sutnyt note 1, at 11).
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receive specialized and affordable medical assistance anytime and
from anywhere in the world, even in the most remote locations.'" The
story of Zhu Ling exemplifies this point. 42 Ling, a student at Tsinghua
University in China, was suffering from an unknown malady and on
the brink of death when her friends decided to seek medical help via
the Internet." Several internationally-renowned medical experts re-
sponded to Ling's friends' pleas for assistance.'" The doctors, com-
municating exclusively over the Internet, worked together to correctly
diagnose Ling's condition (thallium poisoning) and suggest a course
of treatment." The doctors' diagnosis and suggested treatment ulti-
mately saved Ling's life."
The global reach of cybermedicine is only one of its advantages. 47
Cybermedicine serves. as an alternative for people who are uncom-
fortable with discussing certain medical problems during face-to-face
encounters with physicians." One proponent of cybermedicine notes
that the Internet is particularly well-suited for the sale of Viagra, a
drug treatment for erectile dysfunction in males, for two reasons: (1)
a physical examination is typically unnecessary in prescribing the
drug, and (2) the relative anonymity of cyberspace saves men the em-
barrassment of discussing sexual dysfunction with their doctor or
pharmacist." Thus, cybermedicine promotes health by prompting
some people to seek treatments over the Internet that they would not
otherwise seek in person. 5°
In addition to its accessibility and potential for promoting health,
advocates of cybermedicine also point out that the Internet can be a
valuable educational resource for patients. 51
 With over 100,000 web-
sites devoted to health and medicine, patients are empowered to take
the initiative and become more informed about their own well-
being.52
 Indeed, many Americans already use the Internet as a health
resource; according to one estimation, thirty-three million American
41 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 263; Greene, supra note 9, at 45.
42 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 259.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 260.
47
 SeeJentkings, supra note 2, at 1A.
45 See id.
15 See id,
50 See id.
51 See Eryn Brown, Where to Find Medical Advice on the 1% b, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 1997, at
W2.
52 See id. ;ict Revill, Cyberchondriacs, EVENING STANDARD, Nov. 15, 1999, at 10.
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citizens—one in six people—used the Internet in 1998 to seek health-
related advice. 53
C. Problems with Cybermedicine
Despite the numerous advantages of cybermedicine, many feel
that cybermedicine is "bad medicine." 54 One major concern raised by
critics is the unreliability inherent in performing medical examina-
tions via computer.55 In an Internet medical consultation, for exam-
ple, a doctor may treat a patient without ever seeing him/her or
knowing with any certainty that he/she is speaking truthfully about
his/her symptoms.56 According to Dr. Herbert Ratansky, Chair of the
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs for the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA): "You can't obtain all the information you need
without meeting and examining the patient."57 Dr. Ratansky joins
other critics of cybermedicine worried that online medical care will
result in increased misdiagnoses. 58
In addition to the difficulty in acquiring adequate information in
an online medical consultation, the anonymity shrouding the partici-
pants of cybermedicine exchanges also poses problems. 59 It is virtually
impossible for patients to know for certain whether a given online
practitioner is in fact a licensed or qualified physician. 68 Dr. James
Winn, Executive Vice President of the Federation of State Medical
Boards, notes that: "Doctors who have lost their licenses or didn't
complete their training can hide in cyberspace . . . and cause serious
" See Revill, supra note 52, at 10.
54 See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 31; Jamie Talan, Medical Advice Gels Caught in the Web;
Legality of Practice is Issue, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1998, al. I-ILl; Bogus Detriments, supra note
1, at 113. Dr. Nancy Dickey, president of the AMA, has expressed her view that cybermedi-
cine is "not good medicine" and is "something to be terribly concerned about." Jennings,
supra note 2, at 1A.
55 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 288; Ramirez, supra note 31; Let the Surfer Beware, NEWS-
WEEK, NOV. 16, 1998, at 90.
56 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 288; Zitner, supra note 28, at Cl; Greene, supra note 9, at
45.
57 Ramirez, supra note 31.
68 See id.
" See, e.g., Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at. I ; Good Morning America, supra note 7.
60 See Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at 1D; Good Morning America, supra note 7. Certain
cybermedicine websites provide information regarding the qualifications of their doctors
on staff. See Greene, supra note 9, at 45. CyberDocs, for example, posts copies of the physi-
cians' degrees, board certification, and licenses on its website. See id. Despite these safe-
guards, however, the Internet remains vulnerable to persons practicing medicine under
invalid or false credentials. See Elizabeth M. Cosin, Surfing the Web Just Might Save or Extend a
Life, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 4, 1996, at E-4; Good Morning America, supra note 7.
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harm."61 The problem of unlicensed cybermedicine practitioners is
not merely a hypothetical one, as evidenced by the story of Alvin
Chernoff. 62 Chernoff was struggling with severe depression and
turned to the Internet in the hopes of finding appropriate medica-
tion. 63 He came across the website of Dr. Peter Hitzig who, unbe-
knownst to Chernoff, was under investigation by state and federal
authorities for charges ranging from illegal prescribing of drugs to
having sex with patients. 64 Dr. Hitzig advised Chernoff to stop taking
the medication recommended by his psychiatrist; instead, he pre-
scribed Chernoff an unorthodox cocktail of drugs. 63 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Chernoff took his own life; many speculate that Chernoffs suicide
is attributable to the change in medication. 66
In addition to the tragic Chernoff incident, a study by two Ger-
man public-health specialists lends further support to the notion that
seeking sound medical advice over the Internet is a risky proposi-
tion.67 The researchers contacted seventeen websites offering medical
consultations.63 Each researcher posed as a fictitious kidney-transplant
patient who is troubled by painful, oozing red blisters on his chest. 69
Ten cyberdoctors responded to the researchers' fictitious inquiry."
Three cyberdoctors refused to give advice due to their lack of exper-
tise in dermatology.7 ' Five cyberdoctors gave the proper diagnosis of
herpes zoster and appropriately recommended prompt treatment
with antiviral drugs." The remaining two cyberdoctors, however, gave
questionable medical advice." The first practitioner, who described
61 Ramirez, supra note 31.
62 See Good Morning America, supra note 7. There have been numerous other incidents
where unlicensed doctors were found to be giving medical advice on the Internet. South
Carolina medical regulators discovered that a doctor who had previously lost his license
was giving medical advice on the Internet. See Greene, supra note 9, at 45. Likewise, mem-
bers of the news service, Newsday, found out that Walter Scholl was a medical consultant
for the Prodigy online service despite have lost his license two years earlier. See Bogus
Treatments, supra note 1, at ID.
63 See Good Morning America, supra note 7.
64 See id.
63 See id.
66 See id.
67 See Eysenbach & Diepgen, supra note 7, at 1526.
68 See id.
66 See id. These symptoms describe a textbook case of shingles in an itnmunosup-
pressed person. Lel the Surfer Beware, supra note 55, at 90.
70 See Eysenbach & Diepgen, supra note 7, at 1526.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
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himself as a "well-known naturopathic doctor, lecturer, and author,"
assured the patient that "the . . . cysts are probably nothing to worry
about" and recommended "the homeopathic medicine Apis SOD" and
"vitamin C."74 Another self-described "nutritionist" diagnosed the
problem as congestion of the eliminative organs and advised the pa-
tient to "breathe deeply (fresh air), drink plenty of rain water" and to
"get Red Clover and Dandelion . . . and eat as many as you can." 75 Also
disturbing was the fact that seven cyberdoctors did not respond at all,
potentially costing the patient the opportunity for recovery."
The inherent unreliability of practicing medicine on the Internet
is not the only problem associated with cybermedicine; many com-
mentators also find that the commercial nature of cybermedicine de-
tracts from the medical profession. 77 The majority of the medical serv-
ices offered on the Internet—whether consultations with cyberdoctors
or specialized research portfolios—are offered by cybermedicine
practitiOners for a price." Of concern is the possibility that cyberdoc-
tors' sense of duty and responsibility to their patients will be eroded
by their unfettered desire for financial gain." Dr. Nancy Dickey,
President of the American Medical Association, is pessimistic about
the intentions of cyberdoctors: "Physicians are committed to doing
what's best for patients, and it would appear to me that the motiva-
tions in these kind of websites are far more financial than patient well-
being."8° Dr. Robert Filice may exemplify Dr. Dickey's worst vision of a
cyberdoctor. 81 A consultant for the Pill Box Pharmacy website, Dr.
Filice readily admits that his Internet practice yields great financial
reward.82 The quality of his practice was called into question, however,
when he prescribed Viagra for a reporter posing as a patient, despite
the fact that the reporter's completed questionnaire noted that he did
not suffer from erectile dysfunction. 83
74 Id.
Eysenbach & Diepgen, supra note 7, at 1526.
76 See id.
77 kill-1111p, supra note 2, at. IA; Baldwin, supra note 8, at 23.
75 See, e.g., Dr. Robert Baker, Ah Yes, Cancer7—Just a Click Here for a Cum,' INDEPENDENT
(U.K.), Nov. 18, 1999, at 9; Fisher, supra note 37, at W08. Furthermore, medical informa-
tion sites are vehicles to advertise and sell products. See Tyler, supra note 3, at 273. Adver-
tisers spent $74 million on Internet advertising in 1996 alone. See id.
Seejennings, supra note 2, at 1A; Baldwin, supra note 8, at 23.
"Jennings, supra note 2, at 1A.
51 See id.
82 See id.
97 See id.
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D. The Current Lack of State and Federal Regulation of Cybermedicine
To date, there has been no meaningful state regulation of cy-
bermedicine in the United States. 84
 States regulate the practice of
medicine through unique state licensure laws.85
 Current state licens-
ing statutes require physicians to be licensed in the state in which they
practice medicine. 86
 Doctors providing medical advice over the Inter-
net, however, often consult with patients residing in other states; thus,
these doctors may be practicing medicine in places where they are not
licensed to do so. 87
 Most states, however, have not explicitly included
medical consultations over the Internet within their statutory
definition of the "practice of medicine."88
 Thus, at present, state laws
lack specific licensing provisions for cybermedicine. 89
 Consequently,
few states have prosecuted individual physicians or websites for the
practice of cybermedicine without a license. 80
Federal regulation of cybermedicine is similarly non-existent. 91 At
present, no federal agency oversees cybermedicine. 92 Though some
members of Congress have initiated legislation proposing a national
licensing scheme, Congress as a whole has yet to take any action in
this regard.83
 In 1996, the House of Delegates of the Federation of
State Medical Boards approved the Model Legislation Regarding Li-
censure (the "Model Act"), which proposes a special-purpose license
84 See Greene, supra note 9, at 45; Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at ID.
85 See GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 3.
86 See id.
87
 See id.; Spielberg, supra note 18, at 291.
138 See GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 4.
89 See id. at 4-5; Ranney V. Wiesemann, Note, On-Line or On-Call? Legal and Ethical Chal-
lenges Emergi ng in Cybermedicine, 43 Sr. Louts U. L.J. 1119, 1146 (1999).
90
 See Rita Rubin, Prescribing On Line: Industry's Rapid Growth, Change Defy Regulation,
USA TODAY, NOV. 2, 1998, at IA (reporting that, despite ongoing investigations by five
states—Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Texas, and Washington—into doctors performing
online consultations for Viagra prescriptions, no physicians had been disciplined or taken
into court). But see Jennings, supra note 2, at IA (noting that Ohio issued several cease-and-
desist orders against pharmacies who were unlicensed in Ohio yet shipped pills there).
91 See Wiesemann, supra note 89, at 1148; Jennings, supra note 2, at 1A.
92 See Jennings, supra note 2, at IA. Dr. Steven Kohler, co-founder of CyberDocs, pre-
dicts and recognizes the necessity of the creation of regulatory agencies to stem the abuses
in cybermedicine. See id.
93 See Improved Access for Telehealth Act of 1997, H.R. 966, 105th Cong. (1997);
Comprehensive Telehealth Act of 1997, S. 385, 105th Cong. (1997). In 1997, Representa-
tive Larry Combest (R.Tex.) and Senator Kent Conrad (D-N.D.) each introduced a bill in
the House and Senate, respectively, that called for a study of physician licensure and tele-
medicine; neither bill was voted upon by Congress. See Improved Access for Telehealth Act
of 1997, H.R. 966, 105th Cong. (1997); Comprehensive Telehealth Act of 1997, S. 385,
105th Cong. (1997).
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that would allow physicians to engage in the practice of medicine
across state lines.94 Though its language is broad enough to encom-
pass the practice of medicine over state lines via the Internet, the
Model Act does not promise to have a significant impact on cyber-
medicine, considering that only two states have adopted it. 95 Com-
mentators generally are not optimistic that federal authorities will be
able to wrest control over physician licensing from the states in the
near future.96
Since there presently are no state or federal regulations of cy-
bermedicine, cyberdoctors themselves determine the standards of cy-
bermedicine. 97 Some cyberdoctors strictly adhere to state licensing
laws." For example, the Massachusetts-licensed doctors affiliated with
CyberDocs choose to restrict their services only to patients logging in
from Massachusetts or from outside of the United States.99 Currently,
there is a movement towards the adoption by cybermedicine sites of
self-regulatory codes of conduct. 1°° The leading advocate of self-
regulation is the Health on the Net Foundation (HON), which has
promulgated a Code of Conduct meant to be displayed on participat-
ing websites. 101 The Code includes provisions containing the following
assurances: (1) only medical professionals provide medical advice on
the site; (2) the information provided on the site is designed to sup-
port, not replace, the relationship that exists between a patient and
his or her existing physician; and (3) most information contained on
" See GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 5. The Model Act envisions a licensing
scheme where physicians wishing to practice over state lines could obtain a special license
from their own state medical board, without having to complete the full licensing process
in the other states where they wish to practice medicine. See Telemedicine: Model Act Would
Create Special Licenses for Physicians Practicing Telemedicine, HEAurn L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at
1645 (Nov. 2, 1995).
95 See GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 6. The Model Act does not specify any
medium of interstate medical practice that it seeks to regulate; rather, the Act proposes a
generic "special purpose license to practice medicine across state lines." See id. at 5. Only
Alabama and Texas have enacted legislation based on the Model Act. See id. at 6.
99 See Spielberg, supra note 18, at 291-92; GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 5.
States, rather than the federal government, traditionally have governed health care and
the practice of medicine under the police power of the Tenth Amendment. See Joy Eliza-
beth Matak, Note, Telemedicine: Medical Treatment Via Telecommunications Will Save Lives, But
Can Congress Answer the Call?, 22 VT. L. REV. 231, 240 (1997).
97 See Terry, supra note 5, at 359-60; Tyler, supra note 3, at 285.
98
 Tyler, supra note 3, at 285.
" See id. Though the issue lies beyond the scope of this Note, some commentators see
the need for the creation of an international regulatory body to issue cybermedicine
reuses. See Eysenbach & l)iepgen, supra note 7, at 1526.
Ir* See Terry, supra note 5, at 359.
101
 See id.
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the site is supported by clear references to source data." A growing
number of cybermedicine websites display the HON logo and purport
to comply with its Code."
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
DOCTRINE
A. Statement of the Doctrine
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine—derived from vari-
ous sources including ethical rules established by the AMA, common
law, and state law—prohibits corporations and other business entities
from practicing medicine." In practical terms, the doctrine renders
unlawful the employment of doctors by unlicensed individuals or by
corporations that are not formed and owned by doctors." While ap-
plication of the doctrine has varied over time and from state to state,
it remains a viable legal restriction in most states to date."
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine can be an effective
tool in regulating improper medical practices.m For example, courts
102 See id.
10 See id. at 360.
I" See Indest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 33-34. The corporate practice of medicine doc-
trine is alternately referred to as the "prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine"
or the "unauthorized corporate practice of medicine doctrine." Id.
i°5 See id.
106 NHLA/AAHA, PATIENT CARE AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: IMPACT OF THE
CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE AND RELATED LAWS AND REGULATIONS 6
(1997); Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachro-
nism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 470-71 (1987). A few states
maintain a strong and strictly enforced prohibition against the corporate practice of medi-
cine, including California and Texas. See California Medical Practice Act, Bus. & PROF.
§ 2000 et seq. (1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. an . 4495b, §§ 3.07(f), 3.08(12), and
3.08(15) (West 2000). Many states such as Kansas, Massachusetts, and Minnesota enforce
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine subject to certain well-defined exceptions. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2801 et seq. (1992) (exempting hospitals from the doctrine); Mass.
GEN. LAws cb. 112, § 6 (1996); Mass. GEN. LAws Ch. 111,  § 51 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 176B, § 7 (1996) (prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine other titan by a phy-
sician-owned entity or a licensed clinic); MINN. S-rAT. § 147.081 (1998) (exempting non-
profit corporations from the doctrine). A few states, including Arkansas and Oklahoma,
maintain statutes which would suggest a ban on the corporate practice of medicine but do
not actively enforce the doctrine. See Arkansas Medical Practice Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-
95-101 et seq. (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 491-494 (1989). Finally, a few states,
including Florida, Maine, Missouri, and Vermont, have neither a statutory nor common
law prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine. See generally D. Cameron Dob-
bins, Survey of State Laws Relating to the Cooperate Practice of Medicine, 9 HEALTH LAw. 18
(1997).
107 See Indest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 34.
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have applied the doctrine to nullify improper employment contracts
as well as to impose criminal sanctions on employers and physicians
participating in the corporate practice of medicine.'" One rationale
underlying the prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine is
that physicians need to make medical decisions free from the inter-
ference of lay persons, particularly lay persons whose allegiance ex-
tends more to the bottom line than to the well-being of patients. 109
B, Evolution/Enforcement of the Doctrine
I. AMA Ethical Provisions
Physician licensure and the corporate practice of medicine doc-
trine evolved in the 1800s, when doctors struggled to attain profes-
sional autonomy and the respect of the general public."° Doctors'
archaic medical procedures were not very successful, and sometimes
even dangerous."' In addition, doctors competed for business with
"irregulars," quacks and so-called faith healers without any formal
medical education. 112 Both the quality of doctors and societal respect
for the profession increased following the creation of the AMA in
1846. 115 The AMA quickly adopted the Code of Ethics, which declared
the superiority of regular physicians over "irregulars" and encouraged
the development of legal controls to elevate the status of legitimate
doctors, thus improving the quality of health care. 114 State legislatures
responded by adopting statutes prohibiting the practice of medicine
without a valid license. 115
In the early 1900s, doctors faced another challenge to their
autonomy when a growing number of corporations became involved
in medicine. 116 Businesses began to hire physicians on a salaried basis
IN See id.
100 See id. at 33.
110 See GEORGE ROSEN, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN MEDICAL PRACTICE. 1875-1941,
at 19 (1983); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 82-83
(1982).
in See NHLA/AMIA, supra note 106, at 3. Popular medical treatments during the
nineteenth century included bloodletting, purging and administering heavy dosages of
mercury or quinine. RODNEY COE, SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE 181-82 (1970).
112 See NI-ILA/AM-IA, supra note 106, at 3; ROSEN, supra note 110, at 19.
111 See CARLETON CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAW, AND Enties 103 (1984).
"4 See id. at 106.
115 See Andre Hampton, Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate Practice of Medicine:
Teaching OM Dogma New nicks, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 489,499 (1998).
116 NHI.A/AAHA, supra note 106, at 4; STARR, supra note 110, at 198-206; see also
JAMES BURROW, ORGANIZED MEDICINE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 119 (1977) (noting that
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to treat their employees. 117
 In addition, a corporate practice of medi-
cine developed whereby for-profit medical service companies main-
tained a staff of physicians and marketed their services to the pub-
licus
The existence of corporate forms providing health care raised
many concerns within. the medical community. 119
 Critics argued that
the corporate practice of medicine required physicians to handle an
excessive caseload and thus served to diminish the quality of health
care. 120
 Critics also asserted that the corporate practice of medicine
would hinder the independent judgment of licensed doctors by per-
mitting lay persons to make policy decisions affecting medical care,
such as which patients a doctor could see and the amount of services
a doctor could provide. 1 " In response to these criticisms, the AMA
established ethical principles in 1912 declaring it "unprofessional" for
physicians to be under corporate contro1. 122
 Later, in 1934, the AMA
condemned contractual arrangements whereby lay persons and enti-
ties directly profited from the services rendered by doctors. 123
 Though
the AMA ethical provisions never attained the force of law, they un-
questionably influenced legislative and judicial action upholding the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 124
2. Judicial Enforcement of the Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine
Following the AMA's declaration of the impropriety of corporate
medical practice arrangements, many state courts in the 1930s began
to enforce the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, thus giving
legal force to the AMA ethical provisions. 125
 Generally, courts have
upheld the doctrine through broad interpretation of licensing stat-
"contract practice stood out in the Progressive Era as the most dangerous threat to what-
ever degree of unity the regular medical profession had achieved").
117 See NHLA/AAHA, supra note 106, at 4; STARR, supra note 110, at 200-06; BURROW,
supra note 116, at 119-20.
118 .See STARR, supra note 110, at 204-06.
115 See Jeffrey Berlant, Medical Ethics and Monopolization, in Ernics IN MEDICINE: HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 61, 61 (J. Reiser et al. eds., 1977).
ISO See NHLA/AAHA, supra note 106, at 4; Berlant, supra note 119, at 61.
121 See Berlant, supra note 119, at 61.
1" See NHLA/AAHA, supra note 106, at 4.
125 See id.; Joseph Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice of
Medicine, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 516, 519 (1939).
124 See Hampton, supra note 115, at 501.
125
 See id. at 499; Chase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at 464.
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utes. 128 Most state licensing laws, often contained within states' Medi-
cal Practice Acts, do not explicitly ban the corporate practice of medi-
cine.'" Rather, these Acts simply detail the qualifications necessary for
obtaining a medical license and prohibit the practice of medicine
without one."8 Courts, however, have used such statutory language to
enforce the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, reasoning that a
corporation—because it lacks human qualities such as moral charac-
ter and professional competence—cannot qualify for a license and
thus is prohibited from practicing medicine. 129 In addition, state
courts have used agency law principles to reason that corporations
cannot indirectly practice medicine by employing physicians.'"
In 1936, in People v. United Medical Service, Inc., the Illinois Su-
preme Court illustrated such aggressive statutory interpretation."' In
United Medical Service, the court held that a for-profit corporation
which provided medical services through its clinic was in violation of
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine."2 United Medical Serv-
ice, Inc. was incorporated in 1930 with the purpose of promoting in-
dividual and public health through the study, prevention and treat-
ment of disease.'" To accomplish this purpose, United Medical
Service, without applying for or obtaining a license to practice medi-
cine, employed physicians to provide low-cost medical services to will-
ing patients. 154 The court noted that licensure in the state of Illinois
required the applicant to be at least twenty-one years old and of good
moral character.'" The court inferred from this statutory language
128 See Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 394 F. Stipp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974);
People v. United Med. Serv., Inc., 200 N.E. 157 (III. 1936); see also Manson Willcox, Hospi-
tals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 432, 436 (1960).
127 Sec, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. Coon § 2400 (West Supp. 1987) (providing that
"Idorporations and other artificial legal entities shall have no professional rights, privi-
leges, or powers"). But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-134(7) (1985) (noting explicitly that
corporations other than professional corporations are prohibited front practicing medi-
cine).
128 Satellite and Commercial Medical Clinics, Report of the Board of Rustees: Part II, 253
JAMA 1314,1315-17 (1985).
129 See United Med. Serv., 200 N.E. at 162-63; Hampton, supra note 115, at 496.
18° See Hampton, supra note 115, at 496 & 11.41. The relevant agency principle is that
acts of the employee are attributable to the employer. Courts thus reason that the acts of
physicians employed by corporations are attributable to corporations, thereby creating a
violation of licensing laws. See id.
151 See 200 N.E. 157, 157 (111. 1936).
152 See id. at 163-64.
133 See id. at 158.
134 See id. at 159.
135 See id. at 162.
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that the legislature intended only for individual persons to qualify for
licensure. 136
 Reasoning that United Medical Service—a business en-
tity—could not qualify for an Illinois medical license as could an indi-
vidual person, the court held that the corporation's activities violated
the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine)"
While the type of aggressive statutory interpretation exemplified
by the court in United Medical Service has typically provided a basis for
enforcing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, some com-
mentators have found flaws in courts' deriving the doctrine from the
fact that state statutes limit medical licenses to individuals. 138 One
critic finds the courts' reasoning analogous to an argument that "a
corporation cannot engage in trucking because a corporation cannot
obtain a driver's license." 1" Others have asserted that legislative si-
lence as to whether or not corporations can practice medicine indi-
cates that the corporate practice of medicine is permissible. 140
In response to the critiques of the utilization of aggressive statu-
tory interpretation to enforce the corporate practice of medicine ban,
courts also refer to public policy considerations in enforcing the doc-
trine.'" The considerations typically advanced by courts in favor of
upholding the doctrine are (1) prevention of lay control over doctors,
(2) discouragement of the commercial exploitation of the medical
practice, and (3) avoidance of a division of the physician's loyalty be-
tween patient and employer. 142
 The fear underlying these considera-
tions is the notion that corporate medicine may prioritize financial
profitability at the expense of public health and safety."
In 1974, in Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas employed a public pol-
icy rationale in order to find that a non-profit health association vio-
lated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 1" At issue in Garcia
136
 See United Med. Se•u, 200 N.E. at 163.
137 See id. at 163-64. The court further elaborated upon its holding that United Medi-
cal Service's employment of physicians amounted to the unlawful practice of medicine,
noting that "the practice of a profession requires more than the ability to employ compe-
tent persons." Id.
Ds See Hampton, supra note 115, at 496-97; Cliase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at 466-67.
l" See Hampton, supra note 115, at 497.
110 See Willcox, supra note 126, at 438-39.
111 See id. at 442-43; Hampton, supra note 115, at 497.
142 See Willcox, supra note 126, at 442-43.
143 See, e.g., Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 346 (S.D. 1942) (noting that
the practice of a profession by a for-profit corporation would result in an over-emphasis on
the financial aspects and profitability of the practice).
114
 See 384 F. Supp. 434, 436, 438 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
2001]	 Cmporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine 	 471
was whether the Texas Secretary of State was justified in refusing to
grant of a corporate charter to the San Antonio Community Health
Maintenance Association (SACHMA) due to the fact that one of SA-
CHMA's stated purposes was "the employment of licensed physi-
cians."145 The court affirmed the Secretary of State's decision to deny
a charter, including the following statement outlining the court's pol-
icy concerns:
While it is no doubt true that this nation faces a grave short-
age of doctors, is the panacea to be found in the formation
of non-profit layman corporations? We think not .... To
whom does the doctor owe his first duty—the patient or cor-
poration? ... What is to prevent or who is to control a pri-
vate corporation from engaging in mass media advertising in
the exaggerated fashion so familiar to every American? Who
is to dictate the medical and administrative procedures to be
followed? Where do budget considerations end and patient
care begin? 146
The court was clearly concerned with the aforementioned three pol-
icy considerations—lay control over physicians, commercialization of
health care, and the division of a doctor's loyalties—in holding that
SACHMA's employment practices violated the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine. 147
C. A Demise of the Doctrine?
The structure of health care delivery has changed radically since
the AMA first established the principles underlying the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine in the early 19008. 148 Until recently, solo
practice and fee-for-service payment were the norms in health care. 14°
Supported by the prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine,
the health care system was seemingly immune to the "corporatization"
gripping industries in the mainstream of the economy: 15° Following
the marked increase of health costs in the 1970s and 1980s, however,
145 Id. at 436.
146 Id. at 439-40.
147 see id.
148 See jethir.5 C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 1-2 (1999).
149 See id. at. 2.
150 See id. at 1.
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new health care structures bearing corporate characteristics—known
collectively as "managed care"—rose to prominence)"
In order to accommodate the managed care model of health care
delivery, there have been both federal and state initiatives to carve
exceptions to and otherwise diminish the corporate practice of medi-
cine doctrine. 152
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began to op-
pose the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in the 1970s, claim-
ing that it constituted anti-competitive conduct by the medical
industry)" In 1975, the FTC initiated an action to enjoin the AMA
from publishing and distributing ethical codes limiting physicians'
choices of financial arrangements. 154
 As previously noted, the AMA's
ethical principles proscribed contractual arrangements where lay per-
sons benefited from services performed by doctors. 155 The AMA de-
fended these principles as a means of preserving physician judgment
and protecting patients. 158
 The FTC determined, however, that the
principles reduced competition and increased health care costs by
restricting the creation of more innovative and economical business
structures)" Thus, the FTC issued a Final Order in 1979 requiring
the AMA to eliminate the ethical restrictions. 158 Though the AMA
ethical codes never had the force of law, they did help to establish the
ban on the corporate practice of medicine as accepted doctrine. 159 As
one commentator noted, the FFC's abolition of the AMA ethical re-
strictions greatly weakened the foundation upon which the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine was built. 160
In addition to the FTC initiative undercutting the doctrine, Con-
gress reduced the strength of the corporate practice of medicine pro-
151 See id. at 2; Iv['mum. E. MAKOVER, M.D., MISMANAGED CARE: How CORPORATE
MEDICINE JEOPARDIZES YOUR HEALTH 13 (1998); Indest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 32-33.
Managed care applies simple principles of business management to health care and has
reduced medical costs and limited hospital stays. MAKOVER, at 14-15.
152 See Hampton, supra note 115, at 500; Chase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at 475-82.
I 53 See NFILA/AHAA, supra note 106, at 8; Hampton, supra note 115, at 500.
154 See Chase-Lubilz, supra note 106, at 475-77.
155 See NHLA/AAIIA, supra note 106, at 4; Laufer, supra note 123, at 519.
155
 See NHLA/AAI-IA, supra note 106, at 8.
157 See In re American Med. Ass'n, 94 ETC. 701,1017-18 (1979).
155 See id. at 1036-40. The AMA appealed the Final Order, but the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved its enforcement with only minor
modifications. See American Med. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443,451,453
(2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court later affirmed the Second Circuit's decision per cu-
riam by a divided vote. See American Med. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 455 U.S. 676
(1982).
155 See Hampton, supra note 115, at 501; Chase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at 478.
165 See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at 478.
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hibition with the passage of the Health Maintenance Organization Act
of 1973 (the "1973 Act"). 161 Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) possess many of the characteristics that the ban on the cor-
porate practice of medicine was 'intended to eliminate. 162 HMOs'
fixed-budget structure permits the potential for lay control over phy-
sician decisions. 169 In addition, the fact that physicians are employees-
of HMOs raises the concern that physicians' loyalty will be divided
between their employer and their patients. 164
Prior to the passage of the 1973 Act, many commentators and
physicians perceived the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to
be a hindrance to the establishment and development of HMOs. 166
With the passage of the 1973 Act, however, Congress effectively elimi-
nated the possibility that the doctrine would be a barrier to HMOs. 166
In fact, the very purpose of the 1973 Act was to promote the devel-
opment of HMOs as a means of controlling skyrocketing health care
costs.'" To effectuate this purpose, the 1973 Act preempts state laws
requiring that all of the board of directors of an HMO must be physi-
cians, thus permitting a degree of lay influence in the governance and
administration of HMOs. 1" Although Congress neither expressly pre-
empted nor entirely eliminated the corporate practice of medicine
ban in the HMO Act, many commentators point out that the Act se-
verely disabled the doctrine, making a definitive policy statement in
favor of a corporate-based, competitive health care market. 169
Initiatives to diminish the breadth of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine have not arisen solely at the federal level; many
states likewise have created exceptions to the doctrine. 1" Every state
allows professional service corporations—which by definition are
owned exclusively by doctors—to employ other physicians and share
in the profits derived from their services."' In addition, some states
161 See Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 917 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e
(1994)); Hampton, supra note 115, at 501.
162 See Willcox, supra note 126, at 442-43.
165 See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at 480.
164 See id. at 481.
165 See Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 lowA L. REV. 209, 211-13 (1950).
166 See Hampton, supra note 115, at 501.
167 See id.
166 See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a) (1) (B) (1994).
169 See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at 482.
176 See Indest & E'golf, supra note 12, at 34-35.
171 See id. at 34; Adam M. Freiman, Comment, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Colin-
rate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health Care Envi-
ronment, 47 EMORY L.J. 697, 707 (1998).
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refuse to apply the corporate practice of medicine prohibition to
nonprofit organizations. 172 The rationale that state courts typically
give for exempting nonprofit corporations is that the policy concerns
underlying the doctrine—commercial exploitation, divided physician
loyalty, and lay control over physicians—are not applicable when the
profit motive is removed.'" Another exception to the corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine permits medical schools to hire doctors to
treat patients for instructional purposes. 174
 Finally, corporations are
permitted to hire doctors in a consulting capacity, so long as the doc-
tors have no direct responsibilities to patients and thus are not en-
gaged in the practice of medicine,'"
In 1997, in Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, the Illinois
Supreme Court made a decision which is illustrative of state efforts to
carve exceptions in the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.'" In
Berlin, the court exempted licensed hospitals from the prohibition on
the corporate practice of medicine.'" The plaintiff in the case, Dr.
Richard Berlin, Jr., signed a five-year employment contract in 1992
with the Sara Bush Lincoln Health Center ("Health Center"). 1" The
contract contained a restrictive covenant prohibiting him from pro-
viding medical services within a fifty-mile radius of the Health Center
for two years after the end of the employment agreement. 179 Dr. Ber-
lin resigned in 1994 and promptly began working at a medical clinic
one mile away from the Health Center. 18° The Health Ceriter thereaf-
172 E.g., ND. CENT. Coo4 § 26.1-49-02 (1995) (stating that "a nonprofit health service
corporation ... does not violate limitations on the corporate practice of medicine"); see
also California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4, 11-12 (Cal. 1946) (holding that
nonprofit corporation's employment of physicians to practice medicine does not violate
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
1" See People ex rel. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 431
(Cal. 1938) (stating that "since the principal evils attendant upon corporate practice of
medicine spring from the conflict between the professional standards and obligations of
the doctors and the profit motive of the corporation employes; it may well be concluded
that the objections of policy do not apply to nonprofit institutions"); see also Lisa Rediger
Hayward, Note, Revising Washington's Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine; 71 WASH. L. REV.
403, 410 (1996).
14 See I ndest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 34.
175
 See id. at 35.
16 688 N.E.2d 106, 106 (111. 1997).
177 See id. at 113. By this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision by
the Illinois Appellate Court in Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center; 664 N.E.2d 337 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996), enforcing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine for the first time in
over sixty years. See Indest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 35.
175 See Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 107.
179 See id.
18° See id. at 107-08,
2001]	 Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine	 475
ter sought to enforce the restrictive covenant in the contract and en-
join Dr. Berlin from working at the nearby clinic. 181 Dr. Berlin argued
that the covenant was unenforceable because the employment con-
tract violated the state's prohibition of the corporate practice of
rnedicine. 182 The court first noted that the Illinois Medical Practice
Act contains no express prohibition on the corporate employment of
physicians.'" The court further recognized that certain other Illinois
statutes clearly authorize, and sometimes mandate, licensed hospital
corporations to provide medical services.'" The court reasoned that
the public policy concerns supporting the corporate practice of medi-
cine doctrine, such as lay control over physicians and commercializa-
tion of health care, are "inapplicable to a licensed . hospital in the
modern health care industry."' 85 Thus, the court held that this par-
ticular employment contract was not unenforceable by virtue of the
corporate practice of medicine ban. 186
D. Current Status of the Doctrine
Despite numerous chinks in its armor, the corporate practice of
medicine ban continues to have applicability today.'" In 1996, in
Conrad v. Medical Board of California, the Court of Appeals of California
recognized the continued legitimacy of the doctrine in the state of
California by holding that municipal and county hospital districts
were not exempt from the state's prohibition of the corporate prac-
tice of medicine.'" The plaintiff in Conrad, a hospital district, sought
to validate its policy of making employment contracts with its physi-
cians. 189 Prior to Conrad, hospital districts in California typically
181 See id. at 108.
182 See id. at 110.
18J
	 Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 112.
184 See id. at 113. The court referenced the Hospital Licensing Act, 210 1LCS 85/3
(West Supp. 1995), which defines "hospital" as "any institution ... denoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis and treatment or care of . . . persons." Id.
(emphasis added by court). The court also relied on language in the Hospital Emergency
Service Act, 210 ILCS 80/0.01 (West 1994), requiring "every hospital which provides general
medical and surgical hospital services" to also provide emergency services. Id. (emphasis
added by court).
185 See id. at 113-14.
188 See id. at 114.
187 See NHLA/AHAA, supra note 106, at 7; Chase-Lubitz, supra note 106, at. 470-71.
Chase-Lubitz writes: "Individuals attempting to establish new modes of health care delivery
occasionally detonate a corporate practice landm hie." Id. at 471.
188 See 48 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1049, 1051 (1996).
189 See id. at 1042.
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treated physicians as independent contractors.'" The court inter-
preted the applicable state law as requiring that hospital districts treat
doctors as independent contractors rather than employees."' This
distinction was important to the court because, while an employer has
the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the de-
sired result, in an independent contractor relationship, control may
be exercised only as to the result of the work and not the means by
which it is accomplished. 192
 In other words, the court found that em-
ployment relationships between doctors and lay entities raise ques-
tions of unlicensed control and divided loyalty, whereas independent
contractor relationships preserve a requisite degree of autonomy for
physicians. 193
 Thus, the court held that the district hospital's employ-
ment relationship with doctors violated the ban against the corporate
practice of medicine. 194
Outside of the judicial enforcement context, commentators note
that the public policy considerations supporting the use of the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine continue to have an important
place in modern health care. 193
 The "corporatization" of health care
has produced some tangible benefits, including increased utilization
of preventive medicine and more efficient care of Medicaid pa-
tients.'" Yet many commentators have found that the emphasis on
cost and time management has both reduced the quality of health
care and damaged the doctor-patient relationship. 197 Despite the
commercial nature of modern medical care, patient well-being, rather
than financial gain, ought to be the primary concern for physicians. 198
Thus, one of the essential purposes of the corporate practice of medi-
cine doctrine—the protection of the physician's professional obliga-
tion to the patient's health—is still of paramount importance today. 1"
' 9° See id. at 1048-49.
191 See id. at 1049.
192 See id. at 1043 n.4.
199 See Conrad, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1042-43,1043 n.4.
194 See id. at 1049,1051.
195
 See generally MAKOVER, supra note 151, at 27-48; Hampton, supra note 115.
1" See MAKOVER, supra note 151, at 86.
197
 See id. at 100-05; Hampton, supra note 115, at 519. Doctor C. Everett Koop, the
former Surgeon General of the United States, refers to managed care as a "rapidly prolif-
erating leviathan" that has changed its focus from the original laudable goals of preventive
care and standardization of medical practice to one interested first and foremost in auto-
cratic profit and only secondarily in maintaining health. Tyler, supra note 3, at 262.
1" See MAKOVER, supra note 151, at 31-32; Hampton, supra note 115, at 519-20.
199
 See MAKOVER, supra note 151, at 31-32; Hampton, supra note 115, at 534.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Need for cybermedicine Regulation
In many respects, cybermedicine is both a logical extension of
and a positive force in modern health care."° Cyberpatients appreci-
ate the convenience of being able to obtain medical advice from the
comfort of their home or office in only a matter of seconds. 201
 For
some patients, the opportunity to receive a medical diagnosis and
treatment via the Internet can mean the difference between life and
death.202 For others, cybermedicine offers an opportunity to obtain
medical care for embarrassing symptoms they would otherwise leave
untreated."3 Furthermore, many doctors believe that cybermedicine
offers patients an opportunity to take a more active and constructive
role in the physician-patient relationship. 204
 Given these recognizable
advantages, along with the modern prevalence of the Internet and
other computer technology, cybermedicine may well represent the
future of health care."
The future of Internet health care would be bleak, however, if
cybermedicine were to remain unregulated.206 At present, the quality
of medical advice patients receive over the Internet is often hampered
not only by the impersonal nature of the examination, but also by un-
licensed practitioners taking advantage of the anonymity of the cyber-
space tnedium.20 In addition, the commercial nature of the cyber-
medicine may detract from doctors' professional responsibilities,
particularly their strict duty of care to patients. 208 Clearly, meaningful
regulation of cybermedicine is necessary. 2" Only after its potential
dangers are minimized can cybermedicine be a truly positive innova-
tion in health care delivery. 210
200 SeeTykr, supra note 3, at 263; Bogus Theatments, supra note 1, at 11).
201 See Bogus Tiratments, supra note 1, at I I).
2°2 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 48410 and accompanying text.
204
	 Brown, supra note 51, at 162.
SeeJennings, supra note 2, at LA.
206 See supra notes 54443 and accompanying text.
2437 See supra notes 54-76 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
299 See Jennings, miff: note 2, at 1A; Bogus Treatments, supra note I, at 1D; Good Morning
America, supra note 7.
210 See Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at 1I).
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B. Legitimacy of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine
Until specific cybermedicine regulations are promulgated, states
should utilize the corporate practice of medicine doctrine as an in-
termediate regulatory scheme in order to address the problematic
issues posed by cybermedicine. 211
 Despite the vast changes in health
care delivery over the past century, the practice of medicine in cyber-
space in many ways resembles the historical context in which the pro-
hibition on the corporate practice of medicine originated. 212 Modern-
day "quacks" giving medical advice on the Internet pose the same
dangers to patients as the "irregulars" of the 1800s who competed
with legitimate doctors and tainted the reputation of the medical pro-
fession.215
 Also, the common cybermedicine business model—where
lay persons or legal business entities employ cyberdoctors and profit
from their services—is similar to the corporate medical practice in the
early 20th century that raised concern within the medical profes-
sion. 214
 Given these similarities, the aim of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine—promoting physician autonomy for the benefit of
patients—is well-suited for cybermedicine. 215
The application of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to
cybermedicine remains feasible and necessary even when taking into
account the many characteristics that distinguish the medical world in
the 1800s from today. 216
 Several state courts, such as those of Califor-
nia and Texas, have enforced the doctrine in recent years, despite the
increasingly corporate reality of modern health care. 217
 In addition,
state courts and legislatures, regardless of the extent to which they
have created exceptions to the doctrine, maintain that physician
autonomy is a high priority in the delivery of health care. 215
 As evi-
dence, while the Illinois Supreme Court recently exempted licensed
hospitals from the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in Berlin,
the court nonetheless emphasized the fact that the hospital licensing
process ensured both physician independence and patient safety and
211 See GOLDBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 17; see generally Hampton, supra note 115.
212
 See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
215 See Indest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 33; Willcox, supra note 126, at 442-43.
216 See, e.g., Garcia v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434, 439-40 (W.D. Tex. 1974);
Conrad v. Med. Bd., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1049, 1051 (1996); see generally Hampton, supra
note 115.
217 See Garcia, 384 F. Supp. at 439-40; Conrad, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1049, 1051.
21 B See Berlin v. Sarah Bush lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 113-14 & n.5 (Ill.
1997).
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thus rendered application of the doctrine superfluous. 219 The Berlin
decision demonstrates that the values represented by the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine—patient well-being and physician
autonomy—continue to have a place in the increasingly corporate
climate of modern medicine.22°
The fact that other commentators have advocated the utilization
of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in the modern health
care context lends further support for applying the doctrine for the
purpose of regulating cybermedicine. 221 Andre Hampton, Associate
Professor of Law at St. Mary's University School of Law, favors using
the doctrine to eliminate risk-sharing agreements between physicians
and insurers.222 Under a risk-sharing system, doctors absorb part of
the financial costs of health care. 223 The risk-sharing system is prob-
lematic because the physician's financial goals may conflict with needs
of the patient. 224 Hampton concludes that application of the doctrine
to eliminate risk-sharing arrangements would produce two important
results: it would separate the respective functions of doctors and in-
surers, allowing physicians to concentrate on properly treating pa-
tients; in addition, it would repair the damage to the fiduciary rela-
tionship between physician and patient. 225
C. Application of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine to Cybermedicine
Similar to the benefits foreseen by Hampton in applying the cor-
porate practice of medicine doctrine to risk-sharing agreements, ap-
plication of the doctrine to cybermedicine would serve both to re-
duce the rampant commercialism characterizing cybermedicine and
to eliminate a number of unlicensed cyberdoctors practicing medi-
cine over the Internet. 226 Proper enforcement of the doctrine would
result in the shutting down of cybermedicine websites owned by busi-
ness entities or non-physicians. 227 As a result, cyberpatients would be
assured that existing cybermedicine sites were under the authority
219 See id.
226 See Id.
221 See generally Hampton, supra note 115.
222 See id. at 534.
223 See id. at 509.
224 See id. Hampton exemplifies this conflict in presenting the example of a doctor de-
ciding whether to advise costly procedures that would be helpful to the patient but would
have negative financial consequences for the physician. See id.
2ss See id. at 519.
226 See Hampton, supra note 115, at 519.
227 See, e.g., Garcia, 384 F. Stipp. at 439-40; Conrad, 48 Cal, App. 4th at 1049,1051.
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and control of qualified physicians rather than lay persons.228 As an
additional result of the enforcement of the corporate practice of
medicine ban, any unlicensed cybermedicine practitioners employed
by such websites would be prevented from practicing medicine over
the Internet. 229
 In sum, the application of the doctrine to cybermedi-
cine would help to dispel the current image of an Internet medical
practice as an exploitable business opportunity for lay persons, and it
would also help to establish cybermedicine as a legitimate and safe
way to render and receive medical care. 230
The application of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to
cybermedicine can be achieved in a number of ways. Given that the
doctrine is derived in part from states' Medical Practice Acts, the most
realistic plan for enforcement of the doctrine would involve state,
rather than federal, action.251 Under one possible scheme of en-
forcement, a state attorney general or medical board could actively
enforce the doctrine against corporations and other business entities
that operate cybermedicine websites. 232 Effective enforcement would
hinge upon cooperation from state courts, in the form of aggressive
interpretation of the state's Medical Practice Acts and adherence to
the policies underlying the corporate practice of medicine doc-
trine.233
 Another possible scheme of enforcement would require state
legislatures to enact—and enforce—laws specifically prohibiting the
corporate practice of medicine. 234
In addition to establishing a legal framework for applying the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine to cybermedicine, it would
also be essential for the states—whether through pronouncements by
the attorney general, regulations, or laws passed by the legislature—to
delineate the types of cyberspace interactions to be regulated. 239 The
doctrine only pertains to business entities engaged in the "practice of
medicine"; thus, states would need to define the precise parameters of
228 See, e.g., Garcia, 384 F. Stipp. at 439-40; Indest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 33.
220 See Greene, supra note 9, at 45; Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at 19.
230 See, e.g., Garcia, 384 F. Stipp. at 439-40; Frampton, supra note 115, at 519.
23t See Indest & Egolf, supra note 12, at 34.
232 See, e.g., Garcia, 384 F. Supp. at 434; People ex rel. State Ed. of Med. Exam'rs v.
Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429,429 (Cal. 1938); Conrad, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1038 (civil
claims brought by either state attorney general or state medical board).
233 See, e.g., Garcia, 384 F. Supp. at 439-40; People v. United Med. Serv., 200 N.E. 157,
1 63 (IlI. 1936); Conrad, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1050-51.
24 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-134(7) (1985).
235
 See Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at ID.
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cybermedicine. 236 Current state Medical Practice Acts typically define
"the practice of medicine" broadly. 237 More specificity is required,
however, in addressing the issue of which of the multitude of medical
websites currently in existence provide services constituting the prac-
tice of medicine.238 The state might, for example, expressly designate
the provision of online diagnoses and prescriptions as the practice of
medicine, while exempting other activities such as the compilation of
medical inforination specifically tailored to a particular client's
needs. 228 In defining the boundaries of cybermedicine, states would
guarantee more efficient and consistent enforcement of the corporate
practice of medicine ban. 24°
D. The Limitations of Applying the Catporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine to
Cybermedicine: Assessing Other Long-Term Alternatives
Despite the feasibility and benefit of applying the corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine to cybermedicine, the doctrine provides an
imperfect solution to the problematic issues raised by cybermedi-
cine. 241 First, the prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine
would not be particularly effective in removing the threat of unli-
censed cyberdoctors practicing medicine over the Internet. 242 En-
forcement of the doctrine would only reach unlicensed cybermedi-
cine practitioners who happen to be employed by a corporation or
other lay entity. Furthermore, any unlicensed cyberdoctor affected by
enforcement of the doctrine could later evade its strictures by estab-
lishing an independent cybermedicine website without any corporate
ties. 243 In addition, uneven enforcement of the corporate practice of
2S6 See id.
2" See, e.g., N.Y. ELAM LAw, art. 131, § 6521 (defining the "practice of medicine" as
"diagnosing, treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, de-
formity or physical condition"); 225 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 60/49 (1999) (defining the "practice
of medicine" and providing sanctions for unlicensed persons who suggest a form of treat-
ment for "the palliation, relief or cure of any physical or mental ailment or condition of
any person with the intention of receiving compensation"); See also GOLDBERG & GORDON,
supra note 3, at 3
tae
	 Bogus Treatments, supra note 1, at 1D. There is no real consensus as to what con-
stitutes the practice of medicine on the Internet, See id. Thomas Monahan, executive secre-
tary for the New York State Board for Medicine, states: if someone is diagnosing, that is
considered the practice of medicine. But where's the line?" Id.
2" See id.
2" See id.
211 See Rubin, supra note 90, at 1A.
242
 See id.
242
 See id.
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medicine doctrine among the states could disrupt the efforts to stem
the dangers of cybermedicine.244
 If, for example, one state declined to
apply the doctrine to cybermedicine, lay persons would have a safe
haven in which they could incorporate a cybermedicine business. 245
Thus, states enforcing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
would need to address not only the cybermedicine websites incorpo-
rated within their own state, but also those websites originating else-
where. 246
 Finally, the efficacy of applying the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine to cybermedicine relies on the assumption that
physicians, rather than lay persons, are best suited to minimize the
commercialism in cybermedicine. 247
 As the example of qualified cy-
berdoctor Dr. Filice shows, however, certain licensed physicians em-
phasize financial gain at the expense of quality patient care and thus
are no less a risk than lay persons in terms of neglecting the values
espoused by the medical profession.248
Although applying the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
to cybermedicine is an imperfect remedy, it represents a workable in-
termediate regulatory scheme and is certainly preferable to the status
quo of non-regulation in c-ybermedicine.249 Ultimately, however, ei-
ther the states or the federal government need to enact laws
specifically geared towards regulating cybermedicine. 25° One way to
regulate cybermedicine would be to revise physician licensure laws so
that they explicitly pertain to cyberdoctors. 251
 Such revised laws would
create explicit statutory authority for state medical licensing boards
and law enforcement officials to apprehend unlicensed individuals
practicing medicine via the Internet. 252 Physician licensure has tradi-
tionally been a state function; therefore, the revision of licensure laws
could easily take place at the state level. 255
244 See id.
245 See id.
246
 SeeRnbin, supra note 90, at 1A. Issues of legal jurisdiction over Internet websites are
beyond the scope of this Note. For more information on this topic, see generally Howard
Stravitz, PersonalJurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Required on the Electronic Stream of
Commerce, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 925 (1998), and Richard S. Zembeck, Comment, Jurisdiction and
the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Netwothed World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sm. & TECH.
339 ( 1996) .
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The creation by the federal government of a national standard
for physician licensure would be more effective than any state solu-
tion, however, in that it would eliminate any inconsistencies between
state laws.254 In addition, a federal scheme might better address the
breadth of cybermedicine, which is national—in fact, global—in
scope and not restricted by state boundaries. In addition to changes
in licensure laws, the federal government could also establish an
agency to keep a registry of and otherwise monitor cybermedicine
websites.
CONCLUSION
Cybermedicine offers both the best and worst of Internet tech-
nology. Cybermedicine enables interactions between doctor and pa-
tient previously thought impossible. As computers become more ac-
cessible and increasing numbers of people become familiar with the
Internet, more and more patients will have the opportunity to take
advantage of the unique health care possibilities offered by cyber-
medicine. Despite the numerous benefits of Cybermedicine, the
Internet remains both an essentially anonymous medium and an
arena for entrepreneurs with creative ideas for cyberspace businesses.
Neither of these qualities—anonyinity or commercial opportunity—
conforms with the traditional norms of quality health care, which em-
phasize personalized patient care above all else. The corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine evolved from AMA ethical standards espous-
ing these patient-centered values. Thus, enforcement of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine in the cybermedicine context would
signal an affirmation of professional values in this burgeoning area of
medical practice. Furthermore, giTeri, the present lack of either state
or federal initiatives aimed specifically at improving safety and security
in cybermedicine, the corporate practice of medicine ban would pro-
vide some measure of stability to' , cybermedicine for the potentially
lengthy period prior to the promulgation of cybermedicine regula-
tions.
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